

NGA Review Completed

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Approved For Release 2009/10/08 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000406550001-6

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some terrorist operat	s have also worked in collustions. The Revolutionary G en colocated with Hizballah	uards based in the
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largely a domestic Le political agenda. Wh in 1982 and 1983, the for its existence. S Shia deprivation and [root in Lebanon and h	has achieved a momentum of an do conduct many of their	with its own have been critical ot depend on Iran d by decades of of n, has firmly taken its own. Hizballah
goals. Lebanese Shia officials primarily by Hizballah and Iranian from the shared believelution is the eliminated Hizballah leaders shatestablishing an Islam receptive to Iranian Hizballah elements, by	ism is driven by the movement fundamentalists do not take the cooperation on anti-Wester of that the first step in a similar minimation of Western influence with Iran the ultimate of the state in Lebanon and are encouragement and recommentation of the state of the	rget Western em to do so. rn terrorism arises n Islamic nce from Lebanon. objective of e therefore often dations. Certain by other concerns,

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
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for terrorism in Kuwait and elsewhere.

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The Lebanese Hizballah movement has grown increasingly
independent as it has expanded in terms of membership and resources. Hizballah leaders are now serious competitors for the leadership of Lebanon's large Shia population and command the loyalty of perhaps as many as several thousand armed fighters. There is mounting evidence that the Lebanese Shiasalthough respectful of Khomeini and the Iranian revolutionwill no longer colerate Iranian attempts to dictate their policies. Heavyhanded Iranian behavior and the competition between rival elements within the Iranian Government have also annoyed leaders of the Lebanese Hizballah.
In summary, the Hizballah network has become an autonomous terrorist problem in its own right. Iran supports and advises the Hizballah but cannot control it. It is no longer safe to assume that Iranian officials know in advance about all Hizballah operations.
ranian Involvement in Past Terrorism
While Iran does not appear to be responsible for the current ijacking, there is considerable evidence of Iranian support for

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hi past terrorism in Lebanon. Circumstantial evidence indicates that the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 was the work of pro-Iranian Lebanese Shias, but there is no hard evidence directly linking the act to Tehran.



The "Islamic Jihad Organization," which claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Embassy was probably an Iranian-supported Lebanese Shia group.

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Evidence also pointe perpetrators of the bomb Force contingents in Leb	ed to Iranian-backed loing of the US and Fro Danon during October	anch Multipotional
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Tehran's support for terrorism stems primarily from the perception of the Khomeini regime that it has a religious duty to export its Islamic revolution and to wage, by whatever means necessary, a constant struggle against the non-Islamic world, particularly the US. Tehran's aim is to eliminate Western influence, overthrow pro-Western regimes, and establish Islamic republics. Iranian leaders--both clerics and laymen--are convinced of the righteousness of Khomeini's brand of Islamic

- 5 -

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fundamentalism and believe that other Muslim societies would benefit from it. This religious motivation provides Iranian leaders with a moral justification for the use of terrorism.

Iranian leaders are divided between Islamic radicals and pragmatists who both support the use of terrorism--although for different reasons -- and conservatives and moderates who generally oppose it. Islamic radicals,

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are major advocates of

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terrorism as a legitimate tool of state policy. In their view, the fusion of politics and religion justifies any means to export the revolution. Moreover, radical clerics in Qom who may hold no official position within the regime have independent sources of income and are able to finance and support terrorist operations without government approval.

Pragmatists--such as President Khamenei, Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, and Ayatollah Montazeri--are willing to support whatever policies, including terrorism, that are likely to further Iranian interests.

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They support terrorism because it can be a highly effective instrument of policy, but they also recognize the need for improved state-to-state economic relations and have sought to curb radical excesses. The pragmatists prefer to use terrorism selectively, choosing targets important to Iranian national interests rather than purely revolutionary goals.

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Iranian policy on terrorism is now caught up in the internal power struggle among radicals, pragmatists, and conservatives as Iran moves toward the post-Khomeini era. So long as Iranian pragmatists perceive little cost in supporting terrorist operations, the Khomeini regime will continue its deep involvement in terrorism. Moreover, the US will remain a high-priority target for Iranian terrorism barring the unlikely accession of a conservative coalition.

